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Abstract—Synthetic, or artificial data is used in security ap-
plications such as protection of sensitive information, prediction
of rare events, and training neural networks. Risk and trust
are assessed specifically for a given kind of synthetic data
and particular application. In this paper, we consider a more
complicated scenario, – biometric-enabled cognitive cognitive
biometric-enabled identity management, in which multiple kinds
of synthetic data are used in addition to authentic data. For
example, authentic biometric traits can be used to train the in-
telligent tools to identify humans, while synthetic, algorithmically
generated data can be used to expand the training set or to model
extreme situations. This paper is dedicated to understanding the
potential impact of synthetic data on the cognitive checkpoint
performance, and risk and trust prediction.
Keywords: Synthetic data, cognitive identity management,
risk, trust, bias, computational intelligence
I. INTRODUCTION
In Artificial Intelligence (AI) system design and devel-
opment, synthetic data often replaces authentic data, or is
used together with the latter. Synthetic data is generated from
a population model, and used to test datasets, to validate
mathematical models and to train machine learning algorithms.
One problem is ‘How well the synthetic data replicates the
authentic data?’ [31], [32], [51]. In this paper, we formulate
it as follows ‘How risky this replacement?’ and ’Can we
trust this synthetic ‘life’ attributes?’ Partial answers can be
found in [5]. Our work advances this further and focuses on a
specific application, – the cognitive biometric-enabled identity
management.
A cognitive security checkpoint for identity management
is a complex dynamic system [23], [52], [53]. Various per-
formance projections of cognitive checkpoint include security
measures, resistance to cyber attacks, public acceptability,
depth of embedding in social infrastructure, type of biometric
traits, links to forensics [29], intelligent models [25], [26],
[28], as well as privacy, risk and trust (R&T) assessments [53],
identity disclosure risks [2]. In this paper, we consider the
AI performance evaluation in terms of Risk and Trust (R&T)
under projections onto synthetic data. We distinguish the
following kinds of synthetic data used in cognitive checkpoint:
1) Synthetic biometrics such as face [49], handprints [32],
speech [39], signatures [15], iris [7], [27] for testing bio-
metric algorithms [33] and modeling critical scenarios
such as biometric attacks [27];
2) Other synthetic data, e.g. for the sensors that detect
concealed (illicit) items; it is usually radar illumination
to detect knives, pistols, grenades) [22], [43];
3) AI decision assistance such as avatar-like human-
machine interfaces [52]; this concept is analogue to the
engineered life form concept [1], [5].
Impact of synthetic data on performance and privacy in
complex dynamical systems such as security checkpoint is a
challenging problem. Various aspects of this problem were
studied in [7], [32], [54], [55]. Privacy issues of synthetic
data were discussed in [5]. However, effects of synthetic
data involved in operational and decision-making processes
in complex biometric-enable systems is an open problem. Our
work contributed to this area.
This paper is organized as follows. In next Section II, we
provide more detailed motivation of our study as analysis of
potential impact of synthetic data on a checkpoint performance
and formulate the problem. In Section III, an approach and
contribution are explained. Definitions of the relevant concepts
are given in Section IV. Our approach is introduced in Sections
V through VI and explained using an experiment (VII). Section
VIII concludes the paper.
II. MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The goal of this paper is to develop an approach to explo-
ration of synthetic data with respect to performance of cogni-
tive checkpoints. Synthetic data are essential for modeling and
operating of cognitive checkpoints. Specifically: 1) synthetic
biometric traits are used in modeling and training various sub-
systems and scenarios; 2) Synthetic radar signals are used for
modeling and training detectors of concealed items; and 3)
Embodied AI decision assistants perform actions on behalf
of an operator. These applications of synthetic data involve
various kind of errors. A common property of these errors is
that they are difficult to ‘undo’. For example, mis-identification
of a person of interest, mis-detection of concealed item, mis-
detection of an attack, or other extreme scenarios may have
catastrophic consequences.
This problem requires R&T assessment at all levels of iden-
tity management that utilizes synthetic data. Trust contributes
to synthetic data acceptance, while risk contributes to its
rejection. For example, to operate effectively on the human’s
behalf, embodied intelligent assistants might need confidential
or sensitive information of the users such as financial details
and personal contact information [9]. Acceptance of synthetic
data in modeling is determined by the combination of both
R&T factors [14], [47], [56]. The contributing factors include
belief, confidence, experience, certainty, reliability, availabil-
ity, competence, credibility, completeness, and cooperation [8].
Perception of R&T can be established quite independently, and
together they determine the intelligent tools success.
There are three main reasons why the synthetic data are
used in modeling and development of cognitive checkpoint:
Reason I: Authentic data, or large volumes of authentic data
including only partially available scenarios, e.g. cyber
attacks and biometric traits for training of deep learning
tools;
Reason II: Critical (boundary) scenarios when it is impossible
to obtain authentic data, e.g. rare events/scenarios such
as impersonation, plastic surgery facial changes, and
ageing process of biometric traits; and
Reason III: Privacy issues. There are two aspects: 1) AI
decision assistants acquire, analyze, and accumulate
privacy-sensitive data to make decision on identity and
estimate R&T [5]; and 2) personal sensitive data can be
replaced by synthetic data [41].
III. CONTRIBUTION
This paper contributes to solving the two important chal-
lenges in identity management based on a cognitive security
checkpoint model. The following research questions and ap-
proaches to their solution are detailed in this paper:
−How to distinguish the attributes of authentic vs. synthetic
data?
Our Approach: The key instrument for this is the pro-
posed taxonomy of the operational landscape.
−How to incorporate the R&T related to synthetic data into
identity management process?
Our Approach: Given operations with R&T (causality
detection, propagation, etc.) and causal network (e.g.
Bayesian network), we propose to use Conditional Prob-
ability Tables (CPTs) as the carriers for the synthetic
data R&T.
IV. BACKGROUND
A cognitive security checkpoint for identity management is
a complex dynamic system with the following elements of a
cognitive system [23], [52], [53]:
Perception-cycle that enables information gain about the state
of identified person,
Memory distributed across the entire system (personal data
are collected in physical and virtual world),
Attention driven by memory to prioritize the allocation of
available resources, and
Intelligence driven by perception, memories, and attention;
its function is to enable the control and decision-making
mechanism to identify intelligent choices. These cogni-
tive elements are distributed in the form of a multi-state
perception-action cycle semi-automated model [52].
In addition, a cognitive checkpoint is a privacy-sensitive model
[9]. Note that a cognitive checkpoint is the most advanced
form of the biometric-enable systems.
Definition 1: Risk is a measure of the extent to which an
entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and
typically is a function of: (i) the adverse impact, or magni-
tude of harm, that would arise if the circumstance or event
occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence [34]. Formally,
Risk= F(Impact, Probability). A protocol for writ-
ing a risk statement is the Condition-If-Then construct.
Given events A and B, the part Condition-If of the risk
statement is formally defined as 0 < P (A|B) = α < 1, where
α is the probability risk A occurs given the conditioning event
B (the root cause event) has occurred.
Definition 2: Trust is the willingness of the trustor (evalu-
ator) to take risk based on a subjective belief that a trustee
(evaluatee) will exhibit reliable behaviour to maximize the
trustor’s interest under uncertainty (e.g. ambiguity due to
conflicting evidence and/or ignorance caused by complete
lack of evidence) of a given situation based on the cognitive
assessment [8], [34].
For example, the R&T identity management process includes
the trusting behaviour, trusting intention, and trusting belief.
Definition 3: Trustworthiness is the degree to which an
information system can be expected to preserve the confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability of the information being
processed, stored, or transmitted by the system across the full
range of threats [34].
For example, a trusted biometric sample acquisition system
should satisfy a set of requirements such as resistance to: 1)
fake biometric target presentation, 2) communication attack,
and 3) acquisition system tampering. This is the bases for the
trustworthy identity management in security checkpoints [55].
In our approach, R&T and trustworthiness are measured in
terms of probabilities. These general notions of R&T should
be specified within the concept of identity management at a
cognitive checkpoint.
The typical goals of security checkpoint modeling are the
following assessments:
− Performance under uncertainty and rare events/scenarios;
− R&T of the decision (correct identification of a given
individual or his/her behavioral patterns), and
− Trust of the human operator in the decision supplied by
the machine intelligence.
These R&T assessments are based on multiple criteria such
as reliability of sources, credibility of information, sensor
precision, recognition algorithm performance etc. These as-
sessments vary among systems. Specifically, R&T assessment
in a multi-state model is (a) distributed over states, (b)
represented in causal relations, available for (c) propagation,
(d) adjustment, (e) fusion, and (f) prediction. The mechanism
enabling these operations is known as probabilistic inference
called machine reasoning [36], [37]. This mechanism with
respect to cognitive checkpoint is explained in [53]. We will
deploy this approach in this paper in Section VII.
V. SYNTHETIC DATA EXPLORATION
Definition 4: Synthetic data is algorithmically generated
data in order to model specific needs or conditions that are
not available, e.g. privacy sensitive data, rare scenarios/events
such as attacks, rare biometric traits, and decision-making of
embodied intelligent assistance, as well as a large value of
data for training and testing tools [5], [54].
Biometric data is the information extracted from biometric
samples, or biometric traits.
Definition 5: Synthetic biometric traits are a class of al-
gorithmically generated biometric characteristics (e.g., face
and facial expressions, fingerprints, palmprints, iris, voice, and
gait) used as source for constructing a biometric profile for
purposes of identity management [19], [33], [51].
Synthetic data quality is evaluated using likelihood between
the authentic and synthetic data, in terms of likelihood metrics
of differences between authentic and synthetic features. An
example of a such metric includes utility as a measure of















It should be noted that several related works on general
systematic understanding of synthetic data and synthetic (ar-
tificial, or engineered) ‘life’. For example, in [1], synthetic
‘life’ forms are identified with various aspects of robotic
learning using perception-action cycles. A more general vision
of synthetic ‘life’ is provided in [48].
Separating the authentic biometric traits from synthetic
ones is crucial in a security system development because this
addresses the R&T of the identity management process [20].
Synthetic data are used in complex systems in various
forms, at various levels of decision-making, and at various
phases of system life cycle. In most cases,
1) Synthetic data are mixed with authentic data using
computational intelligence operations such as R&T as-
sessment, causal analysis, and reasoning.
2) It is impossible to separate the authentic data from
synthetic data for purposes of analysis,
3) It is possible to observe an indirect impact of synthetic
data on the outcome of the system. In our study, we
explore this avenue in various modeling dimensions,
including R&T estimation.
A. Synthetic data landscape
Given a multi-state cognitive checkpoint [53], different
kinds of synthetic data are needed for purpose of modeling
and development. For example,
− synthetic attacks help develop attack detectors and tools
for their impact mitigation,
− synthetic facial expressions are needed for training de-
ception detectors, and
− synthetic biometric watchlist helps improve security mea-
sures.
− detectors of concealed items are trained using a synthetic
data such as illicit items (e.g. guns, knifes, grenades).
B. Synthetic data attributes
Synthetic, or artificial data are characterized by the follow-
ing key attributes: 1) hierarchy, 2) life cycle, 3) relations to
synthetic life, and 4) legality. Details are given in Table I.
For example, synthetic biometric traits and synthetic radar
illumination of concealed objects are characterized by a life
cycle but they have the simplest relations with synthetic life
attributes.
C. Extension of modeling dimensions
We propose the following three-step extension of modeling
dimensions of the cognitive checkpoint through exploration of
synthetic data:
Extension of modeling dimensions
Step 1: Specify the operational landscape.
Step 2: Define cognitive hierarchy of
synthetic data.
Step 3: Provide the taxonomical view of the
multi-state cognitive checkpoint.
Step I: Taxonomy of the operational landscape: The goal is
to develop a taxonomical view on data used in a checkpoint.
The operational landscape is identified and decomposed into
three parts: 1) authentic, 2) synthetic, and 3) semi-synthetic
attributes (Fig. 1):
− Authentic, synthetic and semi-synthetic data can be se-
cured using encryption or cancellable techniques [17];
− Authentic biometric traits (evidence) are acquired from
human, and synthetic biometric traits (synthetic evidence)
embodied in complex system;
− Decision-making based on authentic (original) data (e.g.
human biometrics) or synthetic data (e.g. embodied bio-
metrics);
− Reasoning or judgment based on authentic or/and syn-
thetic data (biometrics, evidence);
− Jurisdiction based on authentic or/and synthetic life
forms.
Step II: Cognitive hierarchy of synthetic data: Synthetic
data used in the checkpoint is divided as follows:
− Primary synthetic forms that are biometrics or non-
biometrics generated using computational intelligence
tools such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
[10]; and
− Advanced synthetic forms such as embodied AI decision
assistant [52].
TABLE I




Refers to synthetic data organization such as synthetic biometrics (face and facial expressions, fingerprints,
signatures, etc.), synthetic attack, and rare event/scenarios.
Synthetic data
life cycle
Systematic process that represents the main stages of synthetic data development such as 1) problem
definition, 2) requirement formulation, 3) model formalization, 4) testing, and 5) implementation.
Relations to
synthetic life
This is category of AI that mimics living systems or processes [48]. For example, the embodied intelligent
assistant mimics humans in conversation, detection of emotion state, and deception features [51], [53].
Legality In some cases, synthetic data may have a privacy problems such as a non authorized use of syntheticbiometric traits in physical access systems, wrong trained embodied intelligent assistant [5].
Fig. 1. Taxonomy of the operational landscape of cognitive checkpoint: real
life attributes (left plane), synthetic ‘life’ attributes (right plane), and their
intersection as semi-synthetic ‘life’ attributes.
The R&T privacy impact of these synthetic data forms is dif-
ferent and requires a different detection procedure. The focus
of this paper is an impact of primary forms of synthetic data.
Privacy impact and control of advanced forms of synthetic data
produced by embodied AI decision assistant have been studied
in [52] using a so called Conflict Resolver that is the R&T
impact detector of decisions produced by the AI assistant.
The trust dynamic of human and AI assistant interactions can
be formalized, for example, using an approach [24]. Trust
level variation is a probabilistic function of human experience
E(n) = 1−K(n), where K(n) is human response on warning
as the probability of a miss (ignore warning), or a false alarm
(mistrust response).
Application of this synthetic data hierarchy to the security
checkpoint model is illustrated in Fig. 2. The R&T of a
subject (traveler and related identity attributes) is assessed
using various mechanisms such as forward R&T propagation
(cause and effect process), and backward R&T propagation
(from cause to effect) through the system states. R&T states
are adjusted using their causal relationships. This is the core
principle of traveler’s risk mitigation. Given the R&T scores
and the screening resources at each state, the R&T fusion
results in a final decision. Data life cycle includes primary and
advanced forms. They impact the authentic data life cycle.
Fig. 2. Synthetic data hierarchy at the technology-independent model of a
multi-state security checkpoint. Synthetic data primary forms (the operational
landscape support) and advanced forms (embodied intelligent assistants).
Step III: Taxonomical view of the multi-state cognitive
checkpoint: We consider a multi-state screening in the dy-
namic cognitive system that:
1) Monitors the traveler data throughout the process of e-
ID checking, face recognition, and continuously assess
the R&T using various sources such as behavioral bio-
metrics, watchlist, AI decision assistant results, etc.,
2) Updates its states based on the intelligence gathered
via human-machine interactions (AI decision assistant),
results of the biometric traits recognition based on
machine learning, results of the concealed object detec-
tion (by adjusting radar illumination, in particular), and
others.
Fig. 3 shows an example of the aforementioned functions
in the context of the cognitive identity management for trav-
elers crossing the borders. The traveler’s identity management
process is implemented in three states, S1 (ID validation), S2
(Traveler authentication), and S3 (Concealed object detection).
Each state contains several sub-states. There are two types
of dependency relationships that exist between states Si and
sub-states: intra-iteration dependency (sub-states in the same
loop), and cross-iteration (previous states) dependency. Each
state Si and sub-state is a part of the ‘Layered Security Strat-
egy’, a contemporary security doctrine [44]. Each state Si and
sub-state generates R&T assessments for further processing
and inference using operations such as propagation, causal
analysis, reasoning, etc.
Because R&T are measured as probability events, they can
be fused or combined, and propagated. These two operations
are the core of two strategies for manage the R&T: Forward
propagation reflects R&T assessment process from causes to
effect, and Backward propagation reflects R&T assessment
process from the effect to the causes. Forward and backward
R&T propagation process provides the systematic evaluation
on traveler R&T caused by various threats, hazards, and
concerns, and cost-effective measures for lowering risk to
an acceptable level. Note that risks propagation can create a
ripple effect generating further risks across the network with
an amplified impact such as snowball effect.
Synthetic data is required at various computational intel-
ligence operations and processes. For example, the sub-state
S
(1)
m of state Sm is defined under learnt ID source reliability
using authentic data from previous experience, while the data
of potential attacks is synthesized. This enables assessment of
the R&T of a such rare events (attacks). Transition between
states S and S
′
with action α is denoted as S α→ S′ . A screen-
ing trace δ =< α1, α2, . . . , αk > is a sequence of actions such
that there exists an execution S0
α1⇒ S1, . . . , Sk−1 αk⇒ Sk.
Note that each state operates as a cognitive agent that makes
a decision regarding the user R&T based on the specific
resources such as previous experience (statistics) and observed
information.
Fig. 3. Taxonomical view of the multi-state cognitive identity management
process. Synthetic data are distributed in various forms and decision levels.
R&T of synthetic data are assessed in complex causal relationships with
authentic data. R&T are propagated from the first state (input) to the last
state (output), and at each state their R&T status is causal analyzed, adjusted,
fused, and predicted. Each state is represented by a perception-action cycle
of sub-states. Red circle marks the sub-states where synthetic data are used.
VI. IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF SYNTHETIC DATA
This section introduces the final phase of our approach. It
was shown in previous sections that 1) Probabilistic nature
of R&T assessments; and 2) There is a mechanism exists
in a multi-state identity management that operate with R&T
assessments such as causal analysis, propagation, prediction,
reasoning, adjustment, and fusion (Fig. 3); Our idea is to
explore this mechanism for the assessment of synthetic data
impact on performance of a checkpoint. For this, R&T as-
sessments of sources of synthetic data (red circles in Fig. 3)
should be integrated in general checkpoint model developed
in [52], [53].
A. Bridging models: supply chain and identity profiling
Multi-state representation of identity profiling (Fig. 3) is a
framework for bridging this model with the advanced supply
chain models.
Supply chain R&T is an event-oriented concept in which
R&T strongly relates to the probability and consequence
of a potentially harmful event. The aim of modeling is to
understand the dynamic behavior of the supply chain facing
R&T of supply chain disruptions.
In supply chain R&T management, standard R&T model is
used that consists the following attributes: R&T event, event
driver, probability of R&T event, impact (R&T), impact driver,
impact probability, and total loss [8], [56].
B. The R&T theoretical framework
The R&T theoretical framework of the multi-state identity
management process consists of three carriers: 1) advances
in supply chain R&T management, 2) emergent needs in
identity R&T management, and 3) theoretical fundamentals
of bridging these approaches. This view is represented in
Table II. Table II (a) represents the research landscapes that
we intend to bridge: the left panel represents ‘Advances in
Supply Chain R&T Management’ and the left one ‘Emergence
Needs of Identity R&T Management’; (b) surveys the ad-
vances in “Supply Chain R&T Management’; and (c) provides
‘Theoretical fundamentals for bridging the approaches’. This
bridging approach enables: 1) separation of cause-effect paths,
2) propagating R&T through these paths, and 3) predict R&T
using appropriate networks. The following similarities enables
this bridging: (a) The multi-echelon supply chain is similar to
the multi-state identity management process; (b) Performance
evaluation is based on probabilistic R&T notions, and (c) R&T
management assumes the R&T causal-effect path discovery
over a set of probabilistic operations. The main mechanism of
R&T assessment in both models is the separation of causal
paths. That is, carrier of R&T, including various kinds of
synthetic data R&T, is the causal-effect R&T path.
VII. MOTIVATIONAL EXPERIMENT
The motivational experiment aims at highlighting 1)
Practical details of detecting the synthetic data impact
on identity management process, and 2) Needs of break-
through solutions for meta-detection and meta-recognition.
TABLE II
BRIDGING ACHIEVEMENTS IN SUPPLY CHAIN R&T MANAGEMENT AND EMERGENCE NEEDS OF IDENTITY R&T MANAGEMENT.
Advances in Supply Chain R&T Management Emergence Needs of Identity R&T Management
1. R&T formalization, assessment, adjustment,
and reasoning, e.g. [3], [18], [35], [45]
The core of an identity management is the ability to form an intelligent
conclusion or judgment under uncertainty.
2. R&T propagation, e.g. [3], [6], [18], [35], [45],
[56]
In multi-state security checkpoint, the R&T assessment should be propagated
(forward-backward) through other states, and adjusted.
3. R&T prediction, e.g. [56] R&T should be predicted
4. R&T causal analysis, e.g. [14] The ‘cause-effect’ paradigm (e.g. Bayesian causality analysis [36], [42]) playsthe crucial role in identity management.
Theoretical fundamentals of bridging R&T managements and extension
• Probabilistic reasoning, e.g. Bayesian networks [36], [37];
• Causal analysis, e.g. Granger causality [21];
• Probabilistic fusion, e.g. copula [16];
• Extrema value theory, and discovery detection, e.g. [4];
• Meta analysis and recognition, e.g. [40];
The common real-world scenario of the ID management
is chosen for this purpose: Given an e-ID, assess the
ID information credibility, that is <Credibility> ≡
<Trustworthiness> + <Expertise>.
A. Inference engine for identity management scenario
Assessment of ID information credibility is represented in
Fig. 4 in the form of Bayesian network and corresponded
Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) where:
Node ID source reliability’ (R ∈ {r1, r2, r3}) denotes the three
level (r1 =‘high’, r2 =‘medium’, r3 =‘low’) reliability
of the e-passport/ID authentication, which depends on
many risk factors such as country of issue, number of
defense levels in the document, life cycle history, type of
the chip, type of biometric modality, type of encryption,
and the type of RFID mechanism.
Node ‘Valid ID’, or ‘Trusted ID’ (V ∈ {v1, v2}) denotes
whether the e-passport ID should pass the validation
procedure (valid v1) or not (invalid v2). The ‘valid’ or
‘invalid’ state reflects the true state of the e-passport
using factors such as watermarks, holograms, ultra violet
threads, micro text, and optical variable ink.
Node ‘ID validation’ (S ∈ {s1, s2, s3, s4}) denotes the
outcome of the authentication of the e-passport. The
scan is subject to various unwanted effects such as
the individual’s mistakes in using the scanning device,
scanner errors, as well as hidden reasons related to errors
in the use of the database, conflicts of comparisons,
and communication errors or delays. These effects are
encoded in the form of the number of attempts at
scanning the individual document; three attempts are
allowed (s1, s2, s3), after which the individual is directed
to manual control (s4).
Node ‘ID credibility’ (C ∈ {c1, c2, c3}) describes the three
level (c1 =‘high’, c2 =‘medium’, c3 =‘low’) credibility
of the outcome of the validation process. If the credibility
of the validation process is known a priori, it can be used
to compute posterior beliefs related to the validity of the
individual document (node V ).
Fig. 4. Assessment of ID credibility (trustworthiness and expertise) using
IV-echelon (state) identity management scenario and its implementation as
4-node Bayesian network. Synthetic data impact is incorporated using CPTs
for nodes R and V .
As an example, consider the following particular scenario:
IF the reliability of the ID source is known
to be ‘low’ and the resulting credibility
to be ‘high’: R = r3, and C = c1, THEN what
is the posterior probability that the ID is
valid: P (V = v1|R = r3, C = c1). This scenario
models a situation of conflict where an unreliable
source produces a credible outcome. The final result is
P (V = v1|R = r3, C = c1) ≈ 0.989. It is very likely that
the ID was valid. That is, trustworthiness of statement ‘the
ID was valid’ making over expert knowledge (incorporated
in algorithms) is 98.9%.
B. Synthetic data traits
Let us assume that in training algorithms for validation of
ID (node V ) and identification of ID source reliability (node
R), synthetic data was used to represent rare events such as
false ID, multiple ID of the same person, and features of
intentional data alteration in the chip (e.g. biometric traits and
text data) as well as a false life cycle history [50]. Probabilities
of these threats are represented in Conditional Probabilities
Tables (CPTs) for nodes V and R: P (V = v2) = 0.01 and
P (R = r3) = 0.2 ≡ low (Fig. 5). There is always risk
that the validation algorithm makes a mistake should the real
rare event occur. For example, features of forgery e-ID are
not detected, or these features can be mistakenly detected in
valid ID. The goal is to assess these risks caused by usage of
synthetic data.
Fig. 5. Assessment of primary synthetic data impact at CPTs as fused Pdf(s)
of R&T factors. Left plane corresponds the impact P (R = r3) = 0.2
(‘ID source reliability’) that represents Pdf(s) of rare events/scenarios models
such as country of issue, number of defense levels, life cycle history, chip
manufacturer, etc. Right plane describes impact P (V = v2) = 0.01 (‘Valid
ID’) that represents Pdf(s) of rare events/scenarios models such as watermarks,
holograms, ultra violet threads, micro text, etc. Rare events/scenarios models
are represented by tails of corresponded Pdf(s), that are fused in order to
obtain summaries of synthetic data impacts.
C. Algorithm
The goal of this motivational experiment is to assess the im-
pact probabilities shown in Fig. 5. The underlying assumption
is that these probabilities addresses the worst-case scenarios
contain valuable information about synthetic data impact. In
this section, we introduce the algorithm for assessment of
synthetic data impact at identity profiling.
It is well understood that the frequency of object occurrence
in identity management process follows a long-tail distribu-
tion. For example, people with true IDs and expired IDs are
much more common than people with false IDs and multiple
IDs. This problem addresses the novelty detection (known also
as anomaly detection, or one-class classification), – the task of
recognizing that test data differ in some respect from the data
that are available during training [38]. Theoretical framework
is extreme value theory, – a branch of statistics analyzing the
distribution of data of abnormally high or low values. Tailed
probability distributions have been used, for example, in study
cyber-risks such as ID theft [30].
Specifically, Fig. 5 represents the framework of the algo-
rithm for computing the values of CPTs that addresses rare
events/scenarios. This is a part of Bayesian causal network
(Fig. 4). The algorithmic description is provided below; Pdf
denotes the probability distribution function.
Standard copula based technique is used for the Pdf fusion
[16]. This algorithm detects synthetic data impact at the CPT
level such as P (R = r3) and P (V = v2). However, an
extension is needed for evaluating the impact at the reasoning
level of Bayesian network, that is P (C ∈ {c1, c2, c3}) in our
case.
Algorithm for assessment of synthetic data impact on
identity profiling
Input: The Pdf(s) of R&T factors for node R
and V (synthetic data)
Output: The Pdf(s) of synthetic data impacts
for CPTs for node R and V
Step 1: Fuse the Pdf(s) of R&T factors for
node R; result is the CPT value P (R = r3)
Step 2: Fuse the Pdf(s) of R&T factors for
node V ; result is the CPT value P (V = v2)
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Synthetic data is an integrated part of complex biometric-
enable systems. Their impact on system performance can be
unpredictable, for example, a neural network that was trained
using synthetic data of unknown quality can produce erroneous
results [5]. In existing studies [19], [51], synthetic data were
not certified qualitatively, and their use was quite casual. In the
real world multi-state identity management, various kinds of
synthetic data (including non-certified) are employed through
the system.
The key results reported in this paper suggest that:
−To distinguish the attributes of authentic versus synthetic
data, one shall use the proposed taxonomy of the oper-
ational landscape.
−To evaluate the impact of synthetic data on identity man-
agement process, one shall conduct the R&T analysis of
synthetic data in terms of impact on privacy. We have
shown that this is translated to 1) the statistical infer-
ence problem, 2) the belief propagation model (causal
network), and 3) the novelty detection technique.
The future work in this direction will include study of
various biases, e.g. biases influencing face recognition [12],
and their impact on the R&T process. Such biases can be
introduced by the models used to generate synthetic data.
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